Brian Sanderson
PH 501 Fall 2012
The Philosophy of Religion
Professor: Dr. Okello
Paper 1. Topic #3 Are humans free or are they determined? Defend your position
The Concept of Freedom Analyzed critically from within assigned readings to include “The Westminster Confession of Faith, 1647”
“The Westminster Confession of Faith” (WFC) was compiled by a group of theologians, assembled in 1643 by the British Parliament, and held at Westminster Abbey for the purpose of achieving doctrinal unity and clarity among a diverse group of Christians.[1] This document is representative of Calvinist orthodoxy. It was hoped that this assembly would end the religious doctrinal disputes that divided the country.
The purpose of this paper is to argue for human freedom by analyzing and criticizing the concept of freedom operating within chapters three and ten of “The Westminster Confession of Faith, 1647.” This will involve first identifying what view or views of freedom are found therein, and supporting that analyses using text from the Confession itself. Once identified, I will render criticism of the philosophic adequacy of the concept of freedom presented. In order to deal philosophically with this theological stance, I must presuppose the doctrine of predestination hypothetically. This will maintain the necessary “boundary between theology and philosophy.”[2]
The concept of freedom that I draw attention to relates to the, “the conflict between our sense of freedom of choice, and the many reasons which seem to suggest that our actions are not free but rather necessitated,” (Hasker 31). The labels used to identify positions of freedom are taken from the texts, notes, and lectures from Dr. Joseph Okello.
Chapter three within the WCF is entitled “Of God’s Eternal Decree.” In discussing freedom of choice, any decree from God that fixes future events, based on His will can certainly affect freedom. The very first statement of this chapter has strong implications in that respect. It states, “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.” There are other statements with equal importance as follows:
By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestined unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestined and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished. (Ch. III, par. III & IV)
Hasker quotes Augustine as stating, “The will of God is the necessity of things” (51). There seems to be no question, given the above statements that God has unchangeably mapped out the future and this predestination logically produces determinism. Hasker calls it “theological determinism,” (51). In light of the language noted so far, I would label it hard determinism, thus negating the freedom of choice.
There is other language, however that seems to be an attempt to soften the determinism and allow for a degree of freedom. An example of this can be found in the phrase, “Nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures” (Ch. III Par. I). This statement, at first glance, could suggest that some freedom is granted but in Par. II the following is stated, “Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.” This clearly points to God’s omniscience, and further claims His decrees are in no way related to that foreknowledge. His decrees are a function of his own will, and are not swayed by any other factors. It appears freewill of the creature is again nullified.
One again might suppose that this absence of freedom is problematic for some people. Especially having one’s ultimate eternal fate foreordained could lead to fatalism. The authors of the WCF may have been attempting to prevent this reaction by offering the following statement:
The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God; and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the gospel (Ch. III, Par. VIII).
I argue that this attempt is weak at best. It is an attempt to give consolation to the effect by providing a way to be sure they will receive everlasting life “from the certainty of their effectual vocation.” This is God’s will, revealed in His word, calling one to obedience and the religious life. The breakdown comes late in Ch. X, Par. IV. It states, “Others, not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the Word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly come unto Christ, and therefore can not be saved.” If both the elect and those not saved can be called by the Word and even be affected by the Spirit, it seems beyond the bounds of possibility to attain the consolation offered. Therefore, what here prevents a fatalistic view if that’s truly intended?
Hard determinism has another problem area relating to moral conduct, reward, and punishment. Given predestination and the absence of freedom of choice how can a person be worthy of either praise or punishment? Yet the confession states:
The rest of mankind was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withheld mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice, (Ch. III. Par. VII).
It would seem problematic to discuss “dishonor and wrath for their sin,” and use the term, “glorious justice” within the same breath if there is no freedom to affect any aspect of one’s behavior. Humans have choice. The experience of choice carries with it the powerful belief that various alternatives are within our power. Nothing prevents a person from choosing one thing or another. Assume all human actions
are causally determined, then who could ever be morally responsible for any action? Nevertheless, rational people believe that in most situations people are indeed morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, not all human actions are causally determined. Whether one cares to admit it or not we hold deep beliefs that we are responsible for our actions. Just try envisioning a social order that would abolish the belief in responsibility completely.
It has been my intention to critically dissect a “best calculated,” “peculiarly excellent” work compiled by "learned, godly and judicious Divines" of the Reformed Tradition. I have argued for human freedom by analyzing and criticizing the concept of freedom operating within “The Westminster Confession of Faith.” The revelation is that the WCF leans most closely to a hard deterministic stance, which therefore excludes human freedom. The authors may have attempted to use language to demonstrate soft determinism, but not successfully. Another failure in my opinion is to effectively eliminate a potential fatalistic response to this confession.
